The Lost History of the most important battle of World War i, 1914-1918
John Mosier is one of the group of ‘revisionist’ historians who have collectively helped fill in the gaps that are created by the standard line of historiography that has dominated the field for as long as I have been reading about it. Even when I had no additional information, I was vaguely aware of the limits in the West Front dominated, England-centric view which starts with the Schleiffen Plan – BEF – Mons – Marne – Ypres – Verdun – Somme and so on. In this view the French hardly seem to be involved in the war at all! Surely they had something to do with it. Also, the million or so Americans somehow never get mentioned.
Mosier’s theory, first brought out in “The Myth of the Great War”, is that much of the history is distorted. The Germans maintained a large tactical advantage over the French and especially the English throughout the war, based on better tactical flexibility and integrated use of large caliber artillery pieces with the ground forces. The Allies did not catch up partly because they ground up their experienced soldiers repeatedly in yet another big push. The Americans were able to match the Germans tactically because their large, fresh forces were taught by the French mountain troops to use similar tactics to the Germans themselves, and broke the stalemate in the Allies favor.
This book, Verdun, is following the same view of the war, but has centralized the focus to the area around the fortified region around Verdun. He widens the scope to the battles in the region in 1914 and 1915, where the city was nearly surrounded in the first offensives, then subsequent September 1914 German offensives again nearly isolated the city, followed by frantic French counteroffensives that bled them white while gaining nothing.
Then came the German major offensive in 1916 that is better known, although Mosier convincingly contends that many major incidents are misunderstood. Then came the Nivelle offensive, which claimed to push the Germans back to their start line. There was only one problem – it didn’t, and they knew it. So for the next year the French had to attack in that area under Petain and could take no credit, since they were taking the positions that they were supposed to have been taken the year before. However, the small, limited goal offensives did rebuild the morale of the army. They took positions, and the leadership didn’t bleed them to death doing it.
In 1918 the Americans came, and in separate operations on either flank of Verdun swept the Germans back in the St Mihiel offensive and then turned and ground them out of the Ardennes tangles in the Meuse-Argonne offensives. They were able to beat the Germans in major operations, which was something the French lacked the strength to do.
As in his other book, this is not a tactical level account of individual battles, but more of a military and political analysis of these battles and the war around it. But it makes sense, and fits with some of the other new historians’ theories too.