A Mad Catastrophe – Geoffrey Wawro

The Outbreak of World war I and the collapse of the Hapsburg empire

The East Front in WWI is very unrepresented in the historic literature, but some new books are coming out for the centennial.  This book centers on the first year of the war effort of Austria-Hungary in WWI, where a whirlwind of bad planning, poor preparation, foolish decisions, and political flaccidness led to an uninterrupted series of disasters in the field that led to them becoming an arm of the German war effort.

The strength of this book is the background it gives on Austria-Hungary, which is pretty rare.  The internal political strains are an important factor in why the army was allowed to lag behind other major powers.  All the powers would find themselves not prepared for the kind of war WWI turned out to be.  Austria-Hungary was unprepared for the last war before that.

Austria-Hungary was unique in having the worst initial war plan.  As much as you might scoff at the supposed Schleiffen Plan, or the .French Plan XVII, what the A-H army planned to do bordered on the insane.  Feeling the need to invade Serbia to punish them for killing the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, they diverted a major part of the army South to Serbia.  But given the rapid increase in Russian units on the other front, this army was then planned to be shipped right back north across the entire country to face the Russians!

Despite the lack of many forces, the A-H army attacked the Russians in the Polish salient right off.  While this had some initial success, the half of the Russian army not tied down by the troops being shuttled to Serbia and back were able to attack into the rear of the advancing troops and send them tumbling back and away.

The offensive into Serbia was an embarrassing failure from the start.  The land is extremely rugged, and the A-H army didn’t have much artillery that could handle the vertical slopes.  The first offensive fell apart.

And if at first you fail, well, do it all over again.  For the rest of the autumn, the army tried and failed to defeat the Serbs, and the Russians as well.  None worked, and the cost was disastrous.  Even the Germans could not prevail and push the Russians out of Poland, having to retreat twice.  The Austrians were pushed back to the top of the Carpathian mountains.

Ironically, the betrayal of the Central Powers by Italy the next year would lead to a resurgence of a sort by A-H.  Many of the varied ethnic minorities in the nation were ambivalent or worse about fighting the Slavic Serbia or Russia.  But all could agree to fight the hated Italians, who were as unready for serious warfare as Austria-Hungary had been the year before.  The savage battles of the Isonzo – twelve in all, creatively named the First through Twelfth Battles – would at least give the country a taste of victory to match the losses.

Take Budapest! – Kamen Nevenkin

The Struggle for Hungary, Autumn 1944

These are interesting times on the Eastern Front.  The opening up of the Soviet Archives has spread from just the works of David Glantz to other authors, and to more varied topics on the four year struggle.  This book covers the first attempt to knock Hungary out of the war and take the capital, which came up just short of the city.  The Soviets would have to regroup and try again in the winter, this time with success.

In the summer of 1944, the Soviets had crushed Army Group Center, driven to the Baltic Coast, and swept into the Balkans, forcing the Romanian and Bulgarians to switch sides.  The Germans were reeling, but the Soviets were tiring as well.  Could they knock out Hungary too, and possibly break out into Austria and points west?

The first part of the plan to take the country quickly was to get the government to change sides and take its defending units out of the line.  Unlike the earlier attempts, though, this was foiled by the Germans backing a coup in their favor and installing a more radical government under Sztojay.  With the enemy at the gates, this new government’s first act was to attack the local Jewish population.

With the chance of an easy win scuttled, the Soviets tried to win by force, using the last reserves for a lunge to Budapest before German reinforcements might arrive.  It was a good try, and they made it to the suburbs before the front firmed up and the weather broke.  As a side benefit, the forces moved here would be missed when the Soviets attacked on the Polish front and drove nearly to Berlin – reaching the Oder.

The book has good information of the unit actions for both sides in the campaign, and it was interesting to get full details over actions usually dismissed in a sentence or so in the books on the whole East Front that was all we had thirty years ago.  The author is fair to each side, even defending Stalin from some of the usual “If Stalin had listened to me, Budapest would have fallen!” claims make by old generals after the war, when it was safe.  He examines Malinovsky’s claim, but doesn’t find it too convincing when the true situation is understood.